This volume collates, well analyzes, and integrates the scholarly research of historians, literary and textual specialists, and archaeologists. In so doing it represents a worthwhile and admirable book on the “artisanal” economy of the Syro-Persian domain of Islam between 700 and 950 CE, the period of the late Umayyads in Syria, the early ‘Abbāsids in Persia, and beyond.Bessard’s book provides “fresh perspectives” (according to Oxford University Press) on the economic development of the Near East (perhaps better referred to as West Asia) focused on the area of the former Byzantine and Sasanian Empires, limited to those empires’ former domains in Greater Syria (Bilād al-Ṣām) and Persia extending to its eastern hinterlands. The main premise is that the success achieved during this period was due to later Umayyad (Marwanid) centralization of imperial power and the “Islamization” of the Empire. The text provides solid analysis of contemporary textual evidence supported by the archaeological remains in the region with a focus on the artisanal craft industry.The evidence for sustained activity is seen in “agricultural dynamism,” as documented by the archaeological record and historical textual evidence. This volume publishes for the first time some of the results of archaeological excavations in the regions and offers good analyses for the economic success of the regions created by the late Umayyads (Marwanids) and the ‘Abbāsids and expanded territorially with continued success. Bessard emphasizes the reliance on late antiquity referred to as Roman (should this period not be referred to as Byzantine?) and Sasanian Persian economic institutions as the basis for the later Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid economic success, one that far exceeded that of Europe during the same time period, leading to the decline of the “West.” Thus, the author’s argument focuses on the success of the former Eastern Roman Empire versus a decline and failure of the Western Roman Empire. That argument relies on the late antique economic urban institutions in Byzantine Greater Syria and Sasanian Persia, all firmly grounded in Roman institutions.Significant to and supporting her research is the “iconographic material . . . for the most part unpublished until now. First and foremost, it comes from archaeological research in Jarash carried out personally and under the direction of A. Walmsley. Photographs of ancient digs, never published, were retrieved from archives in ‘Ammān, Damascus, and Jerusalem, at the Ifpo (French Institute of the Near East), as well as at the State Departments of Antiquities and Museums in Jarash and Palmyra, which are no longer accessible. I was also able to access some photographic archives and logbooks from ancient digs stored in several academic institutions, principally the Belgian Royal Academy of Brussels (Apamea archives)” (7).The Introduction, identical with the first chapter, “The Historical Context,” is divided into subsections (1) “Conquests,” (2) “Ideology,” (3) “Agriculture,” and (4) “Trade.” This part summarizes what is to follow after the period of conquest, demonstrating continuity, not decline, in regionally defined ideology, agriculture, and trade in the Islamic East. This long introduction summarizes the history prior to the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik’s Marwanid innovations, establishing imperial claims that produced later Umayyad success under ‘Abd al-Malik through the ‘Abbāsid period and beyond, both timewise and geographically. Bessard indicates that the scholarship of the twenty-first century to date continues to challenge the early to mid-twentieth-century “preconceived myths of an early medieval decline in the Eastern world” (3), a process initiated by mid-twentieth-century scholarship.“Under the hegemony of the early Islamic caliphates—the Umayyads (661–750) and the ‘Abbāsids (750–1258)—the Near East experienced remarkable prosperity, evolving into one of the wealthiest economies of Eurasia, which, perhaps equally remarkably, has yet to receive concerted scholarly attention. This contrasted with the situation in western Europe, where the collapse of the Roman Empire led to political fragmentation, a breakdown of broader networks of exchange, and a related decline in the standard of living from the fifth to the ninth centuries. This view is very much at odds with early-twentieth century scholarship” (1). Thus, Bessard provides the primary thesis of Caliphs and Merchants by evaluating the success of the early Islamic caliphates in a period of continuity with Roman institutions.The post-conquest period of 634 to 661, which begins with the reign of Mu‘āwiya, is considered separate from the Umayyad caliphal period beginning with the reign of Marwanid Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik. This period is considered continuous with the economic production of Byzantine/Sasanian traditions ultimately derived from Roman precedents. Also emphasized is the supporting ideological continuity and the sustenance for continuity provided by agriculture and trade. “The Muslim conquests seem thus to have generated an economic unit, but within a system that remained, in fact, quite regionally segmented and autonomous. . . . The Near East became in early Islam a gateway between these Islamized areas that various trading diasporas interconnected with. . . . This book discusses how the changing power and economic dynamics after the rise of Islam affected retailing and craft” (30).“Part I: Patronage and Power” (with Chapters 2, “A Stamp of Authority,” and 3, “New Perspectives on Urban Economic Planning”) documents and analyzes the transformation of the elite power-wielding class beginning in the Marwanid Umayyad period with the rule of ‘Abd al-Malik and its further strengthening under the ‘Abbāsids. Bessard emphasizes continuity of the period of the Islamic conquest post 634 CE with what came before in the Late Roman period, emphasizing a connection between “domesticity” and crafts production in the urban environment (33). The introduction of new elements to the urban economic environment in the Late Umayyad period beginning in 700–750 led to the success in the Late Umayyad to later ‘Abbāsid expansion to Central Asia and a united Islamic economy.“Part II: Revisiting the Legacies” (with Chs. 4, “Artisans to Producers,” and 5, “Reshaping Marketplaces”) provides the continuity with the historical economic legacy of the Romans, in key industries, the “downfall” of traditional practices within the contextual introduction of change in artisanal industry “from an individual to a collective system of labor” (174). The evidence is from the key artisanal craft industries of pottery, glassmaking, and textile production; as well as that of the food-processing industries, namely oil and wine production and watermills. This part ends with the innovative transformation of physical marketplaces in the built environment from ergastērion to sūq and the changes brought to covered marketplaces—funduq, dār, ẖān, qaysāriyya. Important sites discussed and documented are Palmyra, Apamea, Jarash, and Pella: sites where Bessard spent time excavating, most notably at Jarash.“Part III: Institutional and Religious Generators” (with Chs. 6, “Money Supply and Currency,” and 7, “Islamifiying the Economy”) analyzes the supporting institutions to economic change and success in the currency industry, notably documenting “out with the old,” financial stability of money supply and currency as well as introducing the elements contributing to the Islamification of the economy.“Part IV: Economy and Social Changes” (with Chs. 8, “The Evolution of Labour Patterns,” and 9, “Twilight of the Clerical and Landowning Elite, Rise of the Tuğğār”) initially analyzes the transformation of labor practices, discussing labor conditions, the altered patterns of institutional identity, and the status and makeup of the labor force reliant on textual evidence, utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The second focus of this part provides evidence for the social transformation of those who controlled the economy from the “clerical and landowning elite to the rise of the tuğğār,” defined as entrepreneurs tied by scholarship to the middle class (initiated in the mid-seventh century). Thus, “Chapter 9 more specifically investigates how the economic context of the early Islamic caliphate reshaped the character of Near Eastern urban traders, who emerged from the ninth century as a class of great entrepreneurs, engaging in multiple partnerships” (30).Appendix: Though some chapters include plans/photographs, the Appendix includes a more expansive selection of additional ones.While the content of the book is logically presented, the organizational division of the book into “parts” and “chapters” within “parts” numbered consecutively through the “parts” is a bit cumbersome and at times confusing.Bessard’s summary account of the seventh-century institutional forerunners needs examination. “New Perspectives” is how the book is advertised, but analysis reveals a reliance on many old tropes of Roman and Sasanian institutions. These tropes form the basis for Islamic imperial and economic success of the Late Umayyad–Early ‘Abbāsid periods compared to the same time in Europe, especially notable in the scholarship on Greater Syria and Persia. The “failure” of the West and the “success” of the East, hence the primacy of Islam in the Mediterranean region, has long been demonstrated. The causal effects of Western decline due to the rise of Islam in the East and the reliance of the “West” on Islam in the ‘Abbāsid period was studied early on, notably in H. Pirenne’s 1925 Medieval Cities (and later expanded in Muhammad and Charlemagne, first in 1937 in French and then, 1939, in English): “Without Islam, the Frankish Empire would have probably never existed, and Charlemagne, without Muhammad, would be inconceivable” (Pirenne [1925] 1969: 27). The Islamic medieval world was the interlocutor between East Asia and Europe, and Charlemagne did capitalize on this connection through long-distance trade with Islamic West Asia as intermediary. Bessard does acknowledge this limited success in a territorially fragmented and feudal Europe (1). The purpose of the comparison with the Roman “West” is, however, unclear.Bessard’s attribution of success in the Islamic East as reliant on Roman foundational institutions is reminiscent of the old misconceptions that the Arabs came with no innovation or traditions of their own that would have initiated and perpetuated the economic success of the region. According to the implications of this premise, Arab success in the region with new Islamic principles derives from these very Roman foundations, yet this cannot be sustained without further careful examination of the antecedents in the regions south of Greater Syria. An extreme example of this lack of comparative study can be seen first in K. A. C. Creswell’s observation and assumption (Creswell [1932] 1969: 10–11), and several decades later supported by O. Grabar (Ettinghausen and Grabar 1987: 17–18), that the Arabs came with no architectural tradition of their own. It is only more recent scholarship that challenges the old scholarly models of the nineteenth century.1 Also, the previously held position proclaiming the institutional decline of the “Eastern Roman” Empire with the arrival of Islam was successfully challenged by the beginning of the second decade of this century. The many publications of F. Donner 2010; H. Kennedy 1985, 1986; G. Avni 2014; Bessard; and others, reliant on historical and archaeological evidence, posit and support the sociopolitical and economic success of the region.Why there is such an emphasis on a comparison with the early “Roman West” archaeologically going as far afield as England as a success factor for the eastern Mediterranean region compared to the failure of the Roman/Christian West is unclear. If approached from a more multidisciplinary perspective, material evidence of artistic production confirms the primacy of the Islamic East, including the movement of craftsmen engaged in artisanry to the “European” “Roman” West if that is how Bessard chooses to define the geography of the period.Long well-known is the fact that in the year 1000 CE, Cairo was the largest and most important city of the Middle Ages in the Mediterranean, including for trade and for luxury artisanal production, surviving notably in the works commissioned by Christian nobility and in church treasuries, in works emblazoned with European royal symbols and appearing in Italy, for example in Pisa. Most significantly, Palermo played a huge role in the artistic production commissioned by the Norman conqueror (conquest between 1031 and 1091) and ruler of Sicily, Roger II. Notable here are the Capella Palatina (1131) Fatimid-period paintings of the wooden muqarnas ceiling and Roger’s royal mantle (d. 528 AH/1133–1134 CE), probably made by Arab craftsmen in Palermo, which became the coronation robe of the Holy Roman emperors (it is now housed in Vienna’s Kunsthistorisches Museum) and therefore signifies the important role of Islamic artisanry.If one is to emphasize the expansive links to Mediterranean Europe and even England, why does the volume not include solid research of the Late Umayyad economy extending to its southern territories in Arabia and South Arabia, which was originally part of Sasanian Persia? Nor does the book detail the successes that extend from Egypt to the Maghrib after the ousting of the Umayyads by the ‘Abbāsids in 750. Subsequent to that was the continued brilliant multicultural and multireligious production of the Umayyads in the west al-maġrib (the place of the west)–North Africa north of the Sahara, from Libya to Morocco and originally including both Spain and Portugal.It would have been of interest to note the economic structure of pre-Islamic Arabia South Arabia–the Sabeo-Himyaritic and Nabatean Kingdoms as a part of economic stability in the region and, further, as generators of economic change and success. That occurred first during the reign of the ‘Amīr al-Mu’minīn–Mu‘āwiya and then during the “caliphal” periods of the later Marwanid Umayyads and ‘Abbāsids. In Bessard’s view, scholarship on the seventh century has emphasized a continuity with, and not a break from, preexisting economic infrastructure. It has not examined the introduction of new institutions derived from precedents in Arabia nor the effect of a globalization on the region resulting from the unification of previous empires under the aegis of Islam, and Bessard perpetuates this view. Further, Bessard does not emphasize contributions to the creation of new political and economic infrastructure that arose from pre-Islamic Arab culture and society in Arabia and South Arabia and were clearly present in early Islamic Bilād al-Ṣām between 638 and 661.The book further does not account for scholarship that challenges the politically inspired anti-Mu‘āwiya mythologies created by the ‘Abbāsid writers of Tradition (Hadith). Bessard, though discussing the creation of new economic architectural building types in Medina, continues to perpetuate the attribution of his monumental innovation to possible mythology: “Mu‘āwiya’s agenda for developing marketplaces in the holy city may have been a myth” (35), established in the writings of ninth/tenth century Tradition. The theory that Mu‘āwiya did not create a state is based in the ‘Abbāsid texts of the ninth and tenth centuries, already challenged earlier, in mid-twentieth century scholarship including, notably, in George C. Miles’s 1948 article and subsequently pursued by Clive Foss’s 2010 publication (only two of many publications promoting the alternate theory). These concepts of ‘Abbāsid deniability were called invalid and vociferously challenged by those who followed the alternate theory of statehood creation established by ‘Abbāsid authority. More recently, multiple publications espousing this opposing view of seventh-century empire creation have gained more traction.2Recent scholarship clearly demonstrated that later Umayyad imperial institutions relied not only on Byzantine and Sasanian forerunners: the post-634 conquest under Mu‘āwiya (638–680) introduced to Bilād al-Ṣām and Persia Arab political infrastructure based on tribal mobility and governance as well as economic practices from Arabia. Nowhere in Bessard’s volume are the contributions of Nabateans (other than their use as laborers [228]) in the northern realms of the Hijaz recognized. Nor does the author emphasize the contributions of the Sabeans and Himyarites or, more generally speaking, evaluate the influence of tribal rule from mobile capitals in the formation of the new Islamic imperial economy (the latter discussed in Whitcomb 2011, 2016a, and other publications [e.g., St. Laurent 2019] and not cited by Bessard). Nor are there many examples given for the built environment that depend on earlier sources from Arabia.More closely tied to the consolidation of imperial power and religious consolidation in the Hijaz and South Arabia is newly built and modernized monumental architecture dating from the beginning of Islam (622–634) prior to the conquest of the northern territories and attributable to Mu‘āwiya between 602 and 634. This architecture relies on the pre-Islamic building types then current in Arabia and South Arabia, which are without parallel in the Byzantine/Sasanian, aka Roman, monuments present in the geographic region north of Arabia. Fortresses, mosques, and buildings tied to the economy of that region dominate this pre-conquest conversation. In the pre-conquest period, during the time in which Medinans were an opposing force, Mu‘āwiya saw to it that their fortresses, holding almost symbolic importance to them, were converted to provide shelter for the Umayya family. Textual evidence supports an early date because sources record their demolition by ’Uthman b. ‘Affan (d. 656) for either urban development or political reasons (Lecker 1995: 10–18; St. Laurent 2019: 157–58).Bessard herself (160) provides textual evidence from the writers of Traditions and their subsequent repetition by al-Samhūdī in the fifteenth century for pre-Marwanid introduction of new economic urban institutions. These include Mu‘āwiya’s construction in Medina of two large covered dārs—two-story buildings with courtyard and multiple shops, built near the mosque and attached to the qibla wall—with indications that attached to these were private open spaces, or muṣallās, thus combining economic and religious interests. However, Bessard dismisses the existence of these buildings as possibly existing only in myth (33).3Arab architectural building types were further developed in Arabia and migrated north with the 634 conquest, which stimulated economic development in the new territories. First, new religious and military institutions with forerunners in fortress architecture in Arabia were introduced to the region, for example the ribāts with a combined military and religious purpose along the Palestinian coast. The new Arab residents of that area established new agricultural methods on their newly allotted agricultural estates established by Mu‘āwiya and later, in the ‘Abbāsid period, wrote the religious texts of the Hadith in the ribāts. Some of these may have supported anti-Umayyad and specifically anti-Mu‘āwiya sentiments.Early Umayyad, pre-660, imperial support structure for the economy included new road networks, a postal system, and taxation system, and population movement from one region to another assisted in the process of unification of the empire. In agriculture, there were notable new approaches to water and agriculture with origins in pre-conquest Arabia. These new developments heavily influenced the economy. Control over water sources, irrigation technology, and new agricultural methods were introduced to the north, in Greater Syria,4 producing a vibrant economy in the region. As to population movement, Jews of Caesarea were moved to Tiberias to work in and develop the agriculture of that region (and later moved to Jerusalem by Mu‘āwiya), while Syrian Christians were moved to the Mecca/Medina region for the same economic purpose. At the same time, Ghassanids were moved to Caesarea, as was the Persian Sasanian military. These were part of Mu‘āwiya’s efforts toward imperial unification and the creation of an empire in this period, which provides us an alternative view for when the empire formed (Whitcomb 2016b; Foss 2010). The goal of these population movements was to enact “tribal” unification, focusing on agricultural and economic development, methods already employed in Arabia and South Arabia prior to the 634 conquest.All of these institutional innovations were initiated in the period of Mu‘āwiya in order to secure the coast and establish statehood with the introduction of new building types, water control and maintenance, and agricultural methods that lasted up to the ‘Abbāsid period and beyond. Thus, it seems essential to view the economic successes of the late Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid periods as equally reliant on Arab-introduced institutional contributions to the Byzantine/Sasanian preexisting economic and imperial infrastructure. Together, these separate sources of institutional innovation formed a more united, globally expansive, and successful economy, which flourished between 700 and 950.New religious and imperial palatial structures appeared early on in Islam, all of which had forerunners in pre-Islamic Arabian monumental typology and contributed to the economic development of the region. The mosque derived from the Arabian house plan and the muṣallā, or open-prayer space, was tied physically with economic infrastructure, as in the covered market spaces of Medina, and mosques and muṣallās were built near to marketplaces. In the north, these were sometimes spaces shared with Christians in a society that intentionally was inclusive of all the Peoples of the Book. Also, the Dome of the Rock, a commemorative religious and palatial structure, drew on both the plan and form of the Byzantine commemorative church and the Sabian palace form (called a miḥrāb or sanctuary space—but not the niche of today). The former, known from descriptions of the Palace of Ghumdan in Ṣan‘ā’, is one of the major sources of the form and decoration of the Dome of the Rock (Khoury 1993; more clearly developed in St. Laurent and Awwad, forthcoming).5The economic success of the period 700–1258 resulted from the consolidation of Muslim imperial power and the diminution in the role of other peoples from differing religious persuasions, who went from being egalitarian participants in society and religion between 634 and 680 to becoming “minorities” in terms of legislation, taxation, and the declaration of Islam’s primacy (St. Laurent and Awwad, forthcoming).The above discussion raises an important issue of cited research and the timeliness of citations. Caliphs and Merchants is a project begun “over a decade ago” (ii) and appears to be an extension of Bessard’s doctoral thesis completed in 2012 at the Sorbonne. It is not clear when this book was submitted for publication, but it is evident that the bibliography needed substantial updating to be appropriate for a book published in 2020. The most recent publications cited, and they are few, date from 2016. This perhaps accounts for some of the lacunae noted above, concerning new directions of more recent research, which more clearly establish the contribution of the Early Islamic period between 622 and 680.The book’s major premise is that, rather than the decline posited in earlier scholarship in the economy of the Near East after the Muslim conquest in 634, from the Late Umayyad period (700–750) through the ‘Abbāsid tenth century and beyond, the region experienced an economic efflorescence. Bessard states that this stood in stark contrast to the marked decline and failure of the former “western Roman Empire[’s]” (western Europe) economic system during the same period. First there was continuity with pre-Islamic systems of Byzantine and Sasanian institutions ultimately derived from the Roman economic systems. The period of continuity with Roman institutions led to an era of steady growth in the post-Sufyanid Umayyad through ‘Abbāsid periods, marked by great success and expansion beyond the previous borders of the Byzantine-Sasanian empires, geographically limited by Bessard to Bilād al-Ṣām and the northernmost parts of Sasanian Persia east of Greater Syria. Bessard’s stance is that Europe relied on local, rather than long-distance, trade.The value of the volume lies in its establishment of the economic success of the “caliphal” period, defined as beginning in the Late Umayyad period of ‘Abd al-Malik, stabilized by 700, and expanding during the efflorescence period within the northern geographic reaches of the former Byzantine and Sasanian realms as well as east of the Sasanian Persian empire’s original territory. As Bessard’s scholarship is solidly grounded in textual and archaeological evidence, she provides a convincing argument in a more globalized context of the regional economy’s success. Remaining within the context of her archaeological and textual periods would have been sufficient in providing “new perspectives” to demonstrate the region’s economic success in early and medieval Islamic West Asia under the late Marwanid Umayyads and ‘Abbāsids.It appears to this observer that Bessard should simply have focused on the economic success of the Late Umayyad and ‘Abbāsid Empires in Bilād al-Ṣām and the former Sasanian realm, which led to the broader success in expanding beyond the original territorial boundaries. The expanded discussion attributing that success solely to origins in earlier Roman institutions leads Bessard to misguided conclusions reliant on older scholarly tropes that come to us from late nineteenth- and early to mid-twentieth-century scholarship.